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ABSTRACT 
 
 
MEASURING THE EFFECT OF EDUCATION AID IN INCREASING 
ACCESS TO PRIMARY EDUCATION 
 
 
BY 
Marjorie Rose San Pedro 
 
 
 
As governments gear up to support the new Sustainable Development Goals, 
it is important to determine the impact that education aid has had on the 
previous Millennium Development Goal for education. This study aims to 
determine if education specific aid has been effective in increasing access to 
primary education. The results suggests that education specific aid is only 
significant under certain conditions. While total education aid, primary 
education aid, and government expenditure significantly increases adjusted 
net enrollment rates (NERA) in low income countries, they are not at all 
significant for middle income countries.  Total education aid and primary 
education aid also have a positive impact if a country’s initial NERA is under 
80%.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
Education is considered as an important factor in economic development. It is 
associated with positive externalities and increased human and social capital. 
An educated labor force is perceived to be more skilled and productive, and 
have greater capacity to absorb new technologies, which will in turn result to 
improved economic output. Education also has considerable social impact, 
particularly in terms of income distribution, mortality, and fertility (Barro and 
Lee, 2001).   
Evolution of Education Aid 
Because of its transformative nature, education has become an important 
component of international aid. Educational development goals were first 
discussed at a global level in 1962. This was in line with the pattern of 
economic progress among industrialized countries where the development of 
human resources was a vital part of economic progress  (Education 
Encyclopedia, n.d.). Education became a core part of the global development 
agenda and the goal setting was seen as the first step into loosening purse 
strings when it comes to funding education. When this was not realized, the 
1967 International Conference on the World Crisis in Education was 
convened to rally governments.  
In 1990, global education goals were again revitalized with the Jomtien 
Agreement. It set out to make primary education accessible to all and to 
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massively reduce illiteracy; the first of several global agreements to provide 
education for all. (UNICEF, 1990). In 2000 World Education Forum in Dakar, 
where “it was agreed that no country seriously committed to education for all 
will be thwarted by a lack of resources” (UNESCO 2002, p. 20).  
Public financing of education has been supported because it creates positive 
externalities. Clemens (2004) posited that initial aid efforts were prompted by 
the belief that political will and cutting down financial restraints will help 
achieve the set education goals. Lowering the private costs of education, 
through the subsidization of demand or increasing available supply, will result 
in a positive benefit for society and the economy.  
As Clemens points out, while most studies point out that education outcomes 
depend on more than educational policy and spending, global education goals 
remain to be focused on public financing of education as a main component of 
increasing access to education.  
The 1967 International Conference on the World Crisis in Education was the 
first instance when a monetary estimate of the cost of funding education for all 
was raised, which was then pegged at an estimated $15 billion (Clemens, 
2004). Decades later, Devarajan et al. (2002) continued this line of reasoning, 
equating education outcomes as being proportional to spending inputs, and 
estimated that it would cost $11.4 billion to meet the educational MDG and 
several other studies. 
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Effectiveness of Aid 
The question of education aid effectiveness are extension of the same doubts 
about aid in general. Easterly (2006) has questioned its effectiveness, while 
others have shown positive effects. Thiele et al (2006) point out that these 
type of studies often fail to consider the multiple objectives and/or specific 
purposes of aid. And while it is harder to measure longer-term growth effects 
of aid, focusing on specific outcome variables might be a more reasonable 
way of measuring the effectiveness of aid. Using specific variables, like for 
instance educational attainment, helps to stack donor commitment to actual 
output.  
There are numerous studies that look into aid for education, with varying 
results. The most common analysis of the impact of aid is with regards to how 
it improves access to education. Providing education for all is one of the 
global development goals that the world has put its support behind. It is one of 
the Millennium Development Goals and as such will be an important gauge of 
how well the development community rallied behind it and provided the 
necessary resources to achieve it. 
There are evidences that education aid is not meeting its intended long term 
impact. Recent studies question the effectiveness of education aid in 
improving learning outcomes. This is now leading to a change in education 
goals. The Dakar Framework for Action in 2000 enriches the MDG 
quantitative goals by considering education quality, and that schooling must 
ensure literacy, numeracy and essential life skills. (UNESCO, 2000). This 
change has been globally adopted as the new Sustainable Development 
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Goals for Education specifically considers equitable and quality education for 
all.   
1.2 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
This study looks into the impact of education aid in improving education 
outcomes, specifically increasing access to basic education. An empirical 
analysis of changes in net enrollment rates looks to determine the impact of 
aid in meeting the global goal of providing education for all.  
It hopes to provide additional insight that can help strengthen education policy, 
particularly in terms of education funding through aid.   
The study is arranged as follows. Chapter 2 presents related studies on the 
impact of education aid, focusing on quantitative analysis of education aid in 
increasing access to primary education and the theoretical framework for the 
study. Chapter 3 includes the data and methodology used, including model 
specifications. Chapter 4 presents some descriptive statistics, the results of 
the econometric analysis of the effect of education aid on primary enrollment. 
Chapter 5 contains the discussion of the results and its possible policy 
implications.  
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTION 
The study hopes to provide empirical evidence on the impact of targeted 
education aid on education outcomes.  
Specifically it answers the questions: 
1. Does education aid improve access to primary education? 
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2. How does primary education aid, or education aid for other sub-sectors 
affect primary education enrollment?  
3. Is education aid more effective than government spending in increasing 
enrollment? 
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
The study hopes to establish some evidence of the possible impact of 
education aid. It aims to determine if the resources allocated by donors to 
education has an impact in meeting the global educational goal of increasing 
primary enrollment.  
It expands on the current literature on the effectiveness of education aid. 
Specifically, it divides education aid by allocation type. It also divides the 
countries by the level of development.  
It is hoped that the research can contribute to a more effective method of 
evaluating education programs and projects.   
1.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
This study only outlines the basic question of whether aid has an impact on 
enrollment rates. Because of the availability of comparable data, it does not 
consider other factors that have been found to have an effect on enrollment 
rates, including health, and parental income and education.  
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II. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
 
While there are a number of studies that determine the impact of aid on 
development, there are fewer studies that look into the disaggregated impact 
of aid. The ones that look into the effectiveness of education and health aid 
are even more limited. And similar to studies that look into the link between 
aid and economic development, there are a variety of findings that illustrate 
the impact of aid on education development. Some studies have shown 
negligible impact, while some display a modest positive impact (e.g. 
Michaelowa and Weber [2008]; and Dreher et al. [2008]). Some studies look 
into it further and identify elements that increase the impact of education aid 
(Michaelowa and Weber 2007).  
2.1 FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO INCREASING ACCESS TO 
EDUCATION 
2.1.1 Looking at the demand-side determinants of enrollment 
There are inherent challenges in measuring the impact of education aid in 
increasing access to education, specifically in terms of raising enrollment 
levels. As Clemens points out, one big assumption that is made is that 
“educational attainment is mostly supply-constrained” (Clemens 2004, p. 8). 
This has been challenged by numerous studies that show that there are 
various other factors that influence enrollment rates, including economic 
development, parental education, etc. This throws into question the real 
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impact of educational policies, programs and projects, and as an extension, 
education aid. 
Clemens (2004) posits that as long as private expected benefits are low, the 
incentive for education remains low even with increased access.  Private 
expected benefits, like expectation of demand for skilled labor, are strongly 
driven by economic development and are not necessarily tied to the 
availability of education opportunities. Roberts (2003) in his analysis of the 
impact of health and education aid find that demand side factors like per 
capita income is the main driver of school attendance, with education 
expenditure being statistically insignificant. These findings are echoed in 
Filmer and Pritchett’s (1999) study which looked into completion rates in 35 
countries. 
Studies have also shown that in terms of educational policies, other factors 
like household income and parental education have been found to be 
economically significant in guiding schooling decisions. Indeed Burney and 
Irfan (1995) show that the presence of a school has no significant impact on 
enrollment once you control for parents’ income and education. These 
findings show that simply providing facilities does not necessarily increase 
education enrollment. 
2.1.2 Supply-side determinants of primary enrollment 
A focus on supply side factors is concerned about “the overall level of priority 
and allocation of resources accorded to primary education” (Badloe et al., 
2007, p.7).  
8 
Public expenditure directed towards funding schooling inputs (infrastructure 
and human resources) can be measured by proxies like government 
expenditure and education aid. The reasoning behind using a supply-side 
approach is based on the theory that the lack of resources is one of the major 
constraints behind low enrollment rates. Hence, the amount of input should be 
positively correlated to increases in enrollment. Some of the inputs that can 
be used as proxies for measuring the level of resources include the number of 
schools, teacher-pupil ratio, and government expenditure.  
There have been several studies that apply a supply-side approach in 
analyzing education outcomes. They measure resources available, 
specifically education aid, and include other explanatory variables to 
determine which factors contribute to increasing access to education.  
Wolf (2006) uses completion rates as an explanatory variable in his analysis 
on the impact of ODA on education, health, and water sanitation sectors. 
While the outcomes are positive, there is a question of double counting of aid 
since it counted both project and country programmable aid.  
However, Michaelowa and Weber (2006) improves on Wolf’s research by 
conducting a panel analysis (vs. a cross country study). Their findings show a 
small impact of aid on net primary enrollment, veering into negative impact in 
the presence of bad governance.  
A study by Christensen, Homer, and Nielson (2012), further shows that low 
corruption levels have significant positive impact on enrollment. Democracy 
has some impact as well although it is not really statistically significant. Health 
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outcomes, specifically infant mortality rates, perhaps predictably have strong 
positive significant effects as well.  
2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
2.2.1 Aid flow 
The basic framework of this study is based on the limited view that education 
quantity is largely driven by public financing. At the core of this is that for a 
good portion of time during which aid was dispersed, education projects have 
mostly been supply driven.  
Bilateral aid either goes to multilateral banks like the World Bank, or awarded 
directly to partner countries. In the case of the latter, education aid are either 
applied to programs and projects or as education budget aid, where partner 
countries have the discretion of how they want to allocate their aid (i.e. 
programmable aid).  
FIGURE 1. Funding Flow for Education 
 
Adapted from OECD Website.  
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OECD CRS data reports commitments by sector. Ideally, disbursement 
figures by sector is preferred over commitment aid data. As commitments may 
not all be fully disbursed during the period, commitment data can 
overestimate actual aid flow (Dreher, Nunnenkamp and Thiele, 2008). 
However, only OECD commitment data are divided by sub-sector. Other 
researchers have used a formula to derive sector aid based on overall 
disbursement and sector commitment data (Van de Sijpe, 2010). However, 
that is less precise and may not be representative of actual disbursement.   
A large part of government education spending is usually allocated to 
operational expenses like teacher and administrative salaries, maintenance of 
school facilities. In contrast, education aid are often special programs/projects 
that address a specific lack or need and is for a limited and prescribed period 
of time. It may fund the construction of new schools in an underserved district, 
fund teacher training programs, or pilot a new education program.  
2.2.2 Education Inputs and outputs 
In looking at a public finance driven model, education aid and spending drives 
the increase in enrollment. This is based on the assumption that one of the 
main constraints of education for all is the lack of public financing, whether it 
be in the supply of schools, classrooms, teachers and other resources. It 
minimizes, and even disregards in a way, other inputs like student, household, 
and community characteristics as described in Fig 2.  
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FIGURE 2. An Input-Process-Outcome Education Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: EFA Global Monitoring Report, 2002 
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2.3 FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF EDUCATION IMPACT    
In terms of model specification, Dreher et al. (2008) provide the closest 
framework for an analysis of education aid impact. They point out that along 
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with education aid, public spending on education is considered as top factors 
in supplying education outputs. 
They add lagged education outcome as an additional explanatory variable to 
help account for “possible persistence in outcomes” (Dreher et al. 2008, p. 
297). They consider per capita GDP as control variables, along with literacy 
rates, youth population, and urbanization.  
2.3.1 Issues in Measuring the Impact of Education Aid 
One of the main issues is identifying the metrics which can be used. Proxies 
are usually used to track progress, and these proxies have been changing as 
the education goals evolve.  
One of the common outcome metrics used is enrollment rates, including the 
Millennium Development Goals. Some go deeper and look at completion rates. 
The latter is a considered to be more effective in tracking the progress in 
ensuring education for all since absenteeism and drop-out rates can 
dramatically reduce the impact of increased enrollment. 
Fungibility of Aid 
Another issue is in terms of determining the fungibility of aid as it pertains to 
education. Fungibility is a major issue particularly in the beginning of project 
and program aid. However, recent improvements in project and program 
design often require countries to provide co-funding. In fact, an ADB project 
officer point out that in terms of project size and amount, multilateral and 
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bilateral projects are often dwarfed by the amount that the government invests. 
This is particularly true among middle income countries.  
A fixed panel effect study by Van de Sijpe (2010) also finds low fungibility for 
health and education sector program aid.  
Adverse Selection 
Another issue of concern is the possibility of adverse selection. Van de Sijpe 
(2010) points out the possibility that recipient countries that need and actively 
seek aid would be more likely to use it inefficiently. He does point out however 
that bilateral donors have more discretion in choosing recipient countries that 
have stronger governance measures in place.  
However, personal experience have shown that multilateral donors, while 
subject to demand financing have sector experts that put in place safeguards 
that ensure greater effectiveness and efficiency in terms of meeting set 
development goals. Mosley, Hudson and Verschoor (2004) theorizes that 
“new conditionality” has been effective in giving donors leverage over how aid 
is spent particularly in low-income countries where aid comprises a fairly large 
portion of the government budget. 
Endogeneity 
Endogeneity of aid is a basic concern in conducting aid effectiveness studies. 
Specifically, that donor countries are supporting countries with low net 
enrollment rates (NER). This would mean a reverse causality. Different 
studies tackle this problem in different ways. The study by Michaelowa (2004) 
uses energy aid to control for endogeneity as energy aid was shown to be 
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correlated to education aid but will not be driven by NER. Michaelowa and 
Weber (2006:12) looked at energy aid to address the issue of reverse 
causality. They find that there is “no evidence that the missing link between 
aid resources and educational outcomes could be due to reverse causation.”  
Additionally, the study by Clemens et al (2012) contends that adding country 
and year fixed effects should correct for bias. Also, the model should have a 
downward bias, meaning that the impact of aid will be lower bound.  
2.3.2  Theoretical Model for Analysis  
Dependent Variable 
To determine the impact of education aid on increasing access to education, 
adjusted net enrollment rate is set as the dependent variable. Adjusted net 
enrollment rate (NERA) is defined as “Total number of students of the official 
primary school age group who are enrolled at primary or secondary education, 
expressed as a percentage of the corresponding population” (UNESCO UIS, 
n.d., http://glossary.uis.unesco.org/glossary/en/term/2255/en). NERA is a 
more precise measurement as it reflects the real progress against the 
Universal Primary Education (UPE) goal. 
Computation for NERA is as follows: 
 
Source: United Nations. Net enrolment ratio in primary education. Montreal. Internet site 
http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mi/wiki/2-1-Net-enrolment-ratio-in-primary-education.ashx 
15 
Independent Variables 
Like in Michaelowa’s model, a lag of the dependent variable, NERA, is used 
to account for persistence in outcomes. 
Education Aid is the main explanatory variable of interest in the equation. 
OECD provides both total education aid numbers and ones disaggregated by 
sub-sectors. An analysis of sub-sector aid will be interesting to determine the 
impact of an increase in aid in another sub-sector (non-primary) in primary net 
enrollment rates.  
It is shown as a five year running average to adjust for the lagged impact of 
aid on outcomes (i.e. time before the impact of aid /intervention is 
experienced), etc. (e.g. projects and programs that tend to count all 
commitments in 1 year vs. divided over project life). Having it as a five year 
running average can also help normalize short term fluctuations and reflect 
structural changes. It is expressed in per capita terms to account for variance 
in population size. It excludes budget aid which counts towards government 
expenditure. 
Government expenditure for education is another proxy of resources that will 
be used to account for the rest of public financing for education. Like 
education aid, it will be computed as a 5 year running total. 
Other control variables will be GDP as a measure of the overall level of 
economic development, and State Fragility Index as an indicator of 
governance.  
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Gross domestic product (GDP) expressed as natural log will represent the 
level of a country’s development. Education aid, government expenditure and 
GDP are expressed in natural log for normalization purposes. 
As some studies (Michaelowa, Dreher) found that governance was a relevant 
variable in the effectivity of aid, the State Fragility Index (SFI) is incorporated 
to account for governance and social factors. As opposed to the Freedom 
House index of political rights and civil liberties (FREE) index used by 
Michaelowa (2007), SFI is an index of a country’s fragility, and instead of 
measuring just governance. It takes into consideration other factors that may 
impact education outcomes, specifically enrollment, like for instance the 
presence of conflict. With a maximum of 25 points possible, it adds up a 
country’s score on: Security Effectiveness, Political Effectiveness, Economic 
Effectiveness, Social Effectiveness, Security Legitimacy, Political Legitimacy, 
Economic Legitimacy, and Social Legitimacy. The higher the score, the more 
fragile a country is.  
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III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Adapting Michaelowa’s model net primary school enrollment rates is the 
dependent variable. The main explanatory variables of interest are education 
aid and government expenditure. The panel covers a maximum of 112 low 
and middle income countries. Because of the limited disaggregated education 
aid data available, it only covers the years 1997 to 2013.  
3.1 MODEL SPECIFICATION 
The main model is as follows: 
NERAi,t = β0 + β1NERAi,t-1 + β2lnAIDEDUCi,t +  β3lnGOVEXPi,t + β3lnGDPi,t + 
β4SFIi,t + εi,t 
Where: 
NERAi,t  is the adjusted net enrollment rates for country i and year t.  
NERAi,t-1 is the lagged adjusted net enrollment rates for country i. Both NERA 
data were compiled from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics database. 
The explanatory variable AIDEDUCi,t is education aid for country i and year t . 
The data is gathered from the OECD CRS DAC database.  
Another model will be run to determine the impact of sub-sector specific aid: 
Unspecified aid (includes teacher training, etc.), aid for basic education, 
secondary education, and higher education (both formal and informal). It is 
expressed in natural log for normalization purposes. 
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Model 2: 
NERAi,t = β0 + β1NERAi,t-1 + β2lnAIDEDUCprimaryi,t + 
β3lnAIDEDUCsecondaryi,t + β4lnAIDEDUCtertiaryi,t + 
β5lnAIDEDUCunspecifiedi,t  +  β6lnGOVEXPi,t + β7lnGDPi,t + β8SFIi,t + εi,t 
The variable GOVEXPi,t  is government education expenditure for country i and 
year t. It is gathered from World Bank Edstats database and is also measured 
in per capita terms. It is also shown as a 5 year moving average. It is 
expressed in natural log for normalization purposes. 
GDPi,t  is the per capita GDP for country i and year t. Data was derived from 
World Bank Development Indicators Database. It is expressed in natural log 
for normalization purposes. 
The models include governance using State Fragility Index (SFIi,t) which is a 
measure of a country’s performance in four dimensions: Security, Political, 
Economic, and Social. Data is collected from the Polity IV database of the 
Center for Systemic Peace.  
3.2 MEASUREMENT INSTRUMENTS 
The Hausman test for fixed versus random effects model was conducted and 
based on the results (P=0.0001), the fixed effect model was used.  
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroscedasticity in fixed effect regression 
model was done (P = 0.0000). As the null hypothesis was rejected, the option 
‘robust’ was used to obtain heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. 
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To see if time fixed effects are needed for the fixed effects model, testparm 
was run (P=0.0002). Since we reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients 
for all years are jointly equal to zero, time fixed effects are included. 
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
 
4.1 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
4.1.2 Adjusted Net Enrollment Rate 
Adjusted net enrollment rates have steadily increased since 1997, from an 
average of under 80% to about 90% in a decade and a half. The year 2001, a 
year after the Millennium Development Goals for education was set, saw the 
biggest increase in average NERA (a little over 2%). There was a slight dip in 
2008, but the biggest drop was in 2013, where it stands at 88.8%. This is 
lower than the average NERA in 2010. 
 
  Figure 3. Adjusted Net Enrollment Rate 
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4.1.1 Education Aid 
Aid to education has changed based on aid and government policies. While 
aid to education has grown per year, from a per capita average of 22.69 to 
78.64. (See figure 4).   
 
In terms of sub-sector aid however, there has been a lot more volatility. There 
has been some recent movement to increase support for secondary education 
and tertiary education. Whereas primary aid has been the top sub-sector 
priority in the late 90’s and early 2000s, tertiary education has received 
increasing attention in the recent years, overtaking primary education in terms 
of aid per capita. (See figure 5) 
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Competing interest of governments, both receiving and giving, don’t often 
match up. As a result, aid priorities of donors sometimes don’t match up to 
their needs. As can be seen in Figure 6 for instance, top recipient countries 
like Pakistan receive higher tertiary aid even though their NERA remains very 
low.  
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4.2 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.2.1 Initial results 
Running the two equations as is showed no significant impact of education aid 
or government spending. Only the lagged NERA has been found to have a 
significant impact on net enrollment rates. Dreher (2008) explains this as a 
form of inertia in primary school enrollment. 
Table 1. School Enrollment, Aid, Expenditures, 1997-2013 
 
 VARIABLES (1) (2) 
      
Net Enrollment Rate, Lagged 0.858*** 0.857*** 
 
(0.0439) (0.0436) 
Total Education Aid, log 0.426 
 
 
(0.425) 
 Primary Education Aid, log 
 
0.171 
 
 
(0.199) 
Secondary Education Aid, log 
 
-0.000326 
 
 
(0.159) 
Tertiary Education Aid, log 
 
0.267 
 
 
(0.322) 
Unspecified (Education Aid), log 
 
0.0478 
  
(0.158) 
Total Gov’t Expenditure, log 0.744 0.835 
 (1.021) (1.015) 
GDP, log 0.433 0.525 
 (0.758) (0.725) 
State Fragility Index 0.134 0.110 
 
(0.133) (0.131) 
Constant 6.575 7.140 
 
(6.232) (6.322) 
   Observations 726 725 
R-squared 0.821 0.822 
Number of country 84 84 
Country FE YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4.2.2 Analysis by Income Classification 
Cross-country studies have shown that per capita GDP has a positive impact 
on enrollment. This was not the case as can be seen in Table 1. To improve 
analysis, the data were grouped by income classifications, using World Bank 
classification data. Countries were divided into Low Income Countries (LIC), 
Lower Middle Income Countries (LMIC), and Upper Middle Income Countries 
(UMIC).1 Historical country classifications were used so that the classification 
for a particular year was based on a country’s economic development at that 
point in time.  
The hypothesis is that there should be a difference in the type of impact 
depending on the level of income of that country at that point in time. While 
GDP does in some way account for a country’s development, there appears 
to be a threshold – in this case income classification – where a country’s level 
of development greatly influences how effective aid and education spending is. 
For instance, a study by Mosley, Hudson and Verschoor (2004) showed that 
aid affected government spending but only for countries with a per capita 
income less than $1450. They attribute this to aid being a large part of 
recipient government budgets and limited opportunities for recipient countries 
to shift public resources.   
 
                                            
1 Low-income economies have GNI per capita of $1,045 or less in 2014; lower middle-income 
economies have a GNI per capita of more than $1,045 but less than $4,125; those with more 
than $4,125 but less than $12,736 are considered upper middle income; high-income 
economies have a GNI per capita of $12,736 or more. Thresholds are updated per year. 
Source: World Bank website 
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Results (Table 2) show that total aid and government expenditure for 
education are positively correlated with adjusted net enrollment rates for low 
income countries. Both are significant at a 5% level.  
Whereas total education aid increases NERA by 2%, government expenditure 
increases it by 4.3%. This affirms the supply-side theory that funding is one of 
the biggest challenges low income countries face when it comes to increasing 
access to primary education. 
This also seems to suggest that there might be some seed type effect in play. 
Low income countries tend to benefit more from technical expertise and 
funding as compared to middle income countries. 
Indeed, in lower and upper middle income countries, total education aid and 
government expenditure don’t have any significant impact on NERA. It might 
be due to the possibility that middle income countries (MICs) have higher 
initial net enrollment rates than low income countries. As such investments in 
education have lower returns in terms of increases in enrollment. This can be 
seen in the smaller coefficients of the lagged NERA in MICs.  
Table 3. Average Difference in NERA by Country Classification 
 
LIC LMIC UMIC 
NERA  74.67 89.67 94.27 
Lagged NERA 73.68 89.45 94.36 
Difference 0.99 0.22 -0.09 
 
There is then the possibility of aid and government expenditure being 
redirected towards post primary education. The Asian Development Bank’s 
(ADB) education sector strategy (2010) points out that a lot of Asian countries 
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have transitioned to middle income countries and are more focused on 
increasing access to secondary, vocational and tertiary education to support 
the increase in primary education graduates. The change in focus also 
reflects the evolving nature of their economies and subsequently, their labor 
force requirements.  
The existence of private schools can also be a possible reason for the 
insignificant impact of both aid and government expenditure on NERA. Private 
schools contribute to an increase in enrollment rates and are more likely to be 
present in middle income countries.  
Looking at sub-sector aid, it is interesting to see that aid spending on 
secondary education in lower middle income countries have a negative impact 
on NERA. Meanwhile, it has a positive impact for upper middle income 
countries. One can theorize that this effect has something to do with the level 
of their development. That secondary education aid in LMICs are potentially 
drawing away funds from primary education support, is reflected in the 
negative coefficients for government spending.  Meanwhile, secondary 
education aid is positively and significantly correlated (at 1%) with NERA in 
UMICs because at that level of development, the possibility of receiving 
further education increases the incentive for children to enroll and finish 
primary education.  
4.2.3 Setting an initial enrollment rate threshold 
As Figure 3 shows, net primary enrollment rates are steadily increasing, 
leading to a good percentage of countries having rates that are near 100%. In 
this regard, additional analysis limiting the dataset to entries with an initial net 
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enrollment rate lower than 80% was done. This is to accommodate for the 
high possibility that aid for countries with NERA higher than 80% will be more 
likely to be focused on aspects of primary education (e.g. increasing quality) 
other than increasing NER.  
The results (table 4, column 1) show that education aid has a positive and 
significant (0.05 level) impact for countries with NERA under 80%. It is 
assumed that for countries with lower NERA, increasing access to primary 
education will remain a top priority for donors.  
Table 4. School Enrollment, Aid, Expenditures, Initial NER<80 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
      
Net Enrollment Rate, Lagged 0.836*** 0.780*** 
 
(0.0637) (0.0772) 
Total Education Aid, log 2.164** 
 
 
(1.003) 
 Primary Education Aid, log 
 
1.005*** 
 
 
(0.345) 
Secondary Education Aid, log 
 
0.115 
 
 
(0.315) 
Tertiary Education Aid, log 
 
1.210 
 
 
(0.879) 
Unspecified (Education Aid), log 
 
0.00867 
  
(0.437) 
Total Gov’t Expenditure, log 2.807 2.546 
 (2.989) (3.112) GDP, log 1.112 1.696 
 (1.671) (1.684) State Fragility Index -0.331 -0.397 
 
(0.262) (0.287) 
Constant -0.910 3.290 
 
(8.548) (9.858) 
   Observations 204 204 
R-squared 0.859 0.861 
Number of country 32 32 
Country FE YES YES 
Standard errors clustered at country level are reported  in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Analyzing it further by sub-sectors, NERA rises with the increase of primary 
education aid, with the coefficient being significant at 1% level.  It makes 
sense that where primary education aid only became significant once a 
threshold for the initial NERA was set because it follows the rule of 
diminishing returns. As NERA increases, it takes a lot more input to further 
increase it. Thus, in countries with lower initial NERA, the impact of primary 
education aid is a lot more significant. 
As was found in other studies (Dreher 2008) government spending was not 
found to have a significant impact in increasing enrollment rates. This can 
probably be attributed to the fact that a bulk of government education 
spending are often focused on regular expenses (e.g. teacher salary, school 
maintenance, etc.) instead of targeted programs.  
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Access to primary education is considered as a basic human right. Investment 
in education is also considered as a strong investment in human capital, 
which in turn is an element of economic development. As a result, education 
investment has been a key area for donors and governments.  
Aid to education is positively and significantly correlated to adjusted net 
enrollment rates under certain conditions. Education aid to low income 
countries are found to increase NERA.  
Following the law of diminishing returns, education aid was also found to be 
effective in raising NERA in countries with an initial enrollment rate under 80%. 
There is also some evidence that primary education aid has a significant 
contribution to these countries.  
These findings are crucial to consider particularly for donors looking to 
achieve Universal Primary Education. The diminishing returns to education 
expenditure suggests that at a certain threshold, simply increasing public 
financing is not enough to increase enrollment. It is at this point where 
demand driven elements should be given more consideration.     
The results showing how a country’s level of development is correlated to how 
effective education aid also suggests that aid is more effective in low income 
countries. More interestingly, in middle income countries, the aid funding for 
secondary education is correlated to primary enrollment. That where 
secondary education aid is negatively correlated to NERA for lower middle 
income countries, it is the reverse for upper middle income countries. I posit 
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that this difference is because of the latter’s more advanced support and need 
for post primary education. This would be the point where private returns 
outweigh the opportunity costs, and primary enrollment becomes a default 
requirement.     
The relationship between other sub-sectors (particularly secondary education) 
also has interesting implications – in terms of where it makes more sense for 
donors and governments to direct their funding. That while it is necessary to 
continue advocacy and support for primary education, in middle income 
economies, it would be more effective to channel support to post primary 
education sectors, and leave the financing of primary education to the 
government.  
RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE STUDIES 
This study also highlights crucial gaps in information available both in terms of 
aid (disbursement at a sub-sector level) and education output. Enrollment 
rates are just a basic measure of access. In fact, it would be more insightful to 
see the impact of aid and expenditure on the education index produced by the 
United Nations as a component of the human development index. The 
education index2 takes into account not just enrollment, but also drop-out and 
completion changes. It also accounts for the difference in education systems, 
particularly what counts for basic education in different countries. The real 
impact of aid on access to education will be better measured when these data 
are available and substantial enough to do research on.  
                                            
2  Education index is the “mean of years of schooling for adults aged 25 years and more 
and expected years of schooling for children of school entering age” (United Nations 
Development Programme, http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi) 
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It is important to keep in mind how aid impacts education as the world 
embarks on the new sustainable development goals, particularly in moving 
beyond providing schooling but to ensuring learning in schools. Recent 
studies have shown that there is a wide disparity in the quality of learning 
across countries, where some graduates of primary education are not 
equipped with the basic reading, writing and numerical skills. Indeed, 
education quality is more correlated to economic development than 
enrollment levels. As aid aims to promote real development, it would be a 
more appropriate measure of education outcome for future studies. 
 
   
 
33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDICES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
APPENDIX A 
 
APPENDIX A: SUMMARY OF EDUCATION AID (per capita)  
 
Year Total Aid Primary 
Secondar
y 
Tertiary 
Unspecifie
d 
1997 930.21 232.83 149.44 139.30 412.71 
1998 1163.18 295.92 195.96 276.47 462.71 
1999 2167.18 844.85 281.71 446.37 717.34 
2000 2278.90 783.11 274.11 455.74 835.09 
2001 2559.76 856.71 286.85 662.44 787.35 
2002 2954.04 1009.24 319.58 879.54 770.94 
2003 3041.98 1117.08 327.41 952.60 660.93 
2004 3184.60 1052.89 352.91 1070.49 725.36 
2005 4288.83 1428.93 568.96 1441.49 869.58 
2006 5114.26 1538.75 622.48 1777.05 1185.59 
2007 5176.17 1636.81 532.28 1719.56 1294.78 
2008 6357.97 1711.76 814.96 2010.52 1826.66 
2009 6809.55 1776.54 850.39 2232.18 1952.98 
2010 6695.06 1750.55 794.86 2240.44 1910.85 
2011 6506.73 1751.12 832.67 2164.84 1758.21 
2012 5568.46 1275.18 664.73 1929.46 1699.49 
2013 3145.41 650.42 382.98 927.71 1184.29 
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APPENDIX C 
 
APPENDIX C: SCATTERPLOT MATRIX 
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APPENDIX D 
 
APPENDIX D: COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT MODELS 
 
EQUATION 1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES OLS Between 
Within or 
Fixed 
effects 
First 
differences 
Random 
effects 
lagged NER 0.938*** 0.966*** 0.856*** 0.132*** 0.917*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0175) (0.0422) (0.0331) (0.0120) 
Total Education Aid, log 0.186** 0.0148 0.402 1.069** 0.195 
 (0.0849) (0.182) (0.467) (0.441) (0.135) 
Total Govt Expenditure, log -0.149 -0.245 0.677 4.073** -0.120 
 (0.273) (0.489) (0.964) (1.795) (0.375) 
GDP, log -0.108 -0.0266 0.342 1.711** 0.145 
 (0.308) (0.333) (0.680) (0.807) (0.240) 
State Fragility Index 0.0158 0.141* 0.150 -0.168 0.0545 
 (0.0614) (0.0813) (0.125) (0.118) (0.0589) 
Constant 6.352** 2.981 6.540  5.802** 
 (2.465) (3.678) (4.845)  (2.431) 
      
Observations 726 726 726 593 726 
R-squared 0.966 0.986 0.817 0.075  
Number of country   84 84   84 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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EQUATION 2 
  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES OLS Between 
Within or 
Fixed 
effects 
First 
differences 
Random 
effects 
            
lagged NER 0.936*** 0.960*** 0.853*** 0.124*** 0.915*** 
 (0.0109) (0.0183) (0.0420) (0.0332) (0.0123) 
Primary Education Aid, log -0.00979 -0.136 0.156 0.293 0.0348 
 (0.101) (0.214) (0.224) (0.215) (0.115) 
Secondary Education Aid, log 0.0815 0.204 -0.0260 0.00864 0.0464 
 (0.116) (0.262) (0.158) (0.185) (0.120) 
Tertiary Education Aid, log 0.116 0.109 0.182 1.132*** 0.109 
 (0.0868) (0.208) (0.333) (0.349) (0.134) 
Others (Education Aid), log -0.0215 -0.217 -0.00203 0.291 -0.0240 
 (0.102) (0.287) (0.150) (0.214) (0.126) 
Total Govt Expenditure, log -0.187 -0.416 0.793 3.926** -0.116 
 (0.268) (0.512) (0.975) (1.800) (0.381) 
GDP, log -0.142 -0.157 0.429 1.475* 0.142 
 (0.326) (0.358) (0.679) (0.808) (0.246) 
State Fragility Index 0.0118 0.132 0.140 -0.185 0.0542 
 (0.0623) (0.0827) (0.126) (0.118) (0.0597) 
Constant 7.277*** 4.988 6.957  6.383** 
 (2.645) (4.007) (5.484)  (2.527) 
      
Observations 725 725 725 592 725 
R-squared 0.966 0.986 0.818 0.089  
Number of country   84 84   84 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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